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 Abstract: 
This study examines the impact of gender on the political representation of women in the United 
States. Focusing on members of the House of Representatives, I analyze through congruence and 
legislative decision models whether female representatives are more likely than male 
representatives to reflect the policy preferences of their female constituents. Using data from 
Harvard University’s Cooperative Congressional Election Survey, this paper takes a unique 
approach in analyzing the relationship of politics and gender by tying the stated policy 
preferences of constituents to the actions of their representatives in determining the substantive 
representation of women. The results show that male representatives consistently reflect the 
preferences of their male constituents over those of their female constituents, particularly on 
issues over which men and women disagree. The effect of shared gender on political 
representation is less clear for female legislators. In simple legislative decision models, female 
representatives weigh the preferences of their female constituents more than those of their male 
constituents. However, upon controlling for three kinds of fixed effects, this pattern disappears 
and eventually reverses, with congresswomen exhibiting the same partiality toward the attitudes 
of their male constituents. When the analysis is restricted to contentious bills, those over which 
men and women disagree the most, congresswomen appear to consistently reflect the political 
views of their female constituents to a greater extent than those of their male constituents. 
Supporting literature in this area, shared political party has the strongest relationship with a 
legislator’s voting behavior. I discuss feminist, financial, cultural and political explanations of 
these dynamic results.    
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Introduction 
As Sidney Verba argued, “the equal consideration of the preferences and interests of all 
citizens” is “one of the bedrock principles in a democracy” (2003, 663). While this concept is 
widely accepted as an American axiom, the means by which it occurs is unclear. It is possible 
that equal consideration of all citizens’ preferences requires an equal distribution of their 
characteristics (e.g., gender, race, religion) in office. This notion of mutual resemblance between 
legislature and society rests on the assumption that descriptive representation, the personal traits 
a politician shares with his or her constituents, such as gender and race, may in turn affect his or 
her ideology (Swers 2005). Put plainly, men in office may do a better job representing male 
interests, while female representatives may be superior in advocating on behalf of women. This 
relationship appears simultaneously intuitive and erroneous.  
On one hand, one needs only to reflect on the waves of the feminist movement in this 
country to observe the communal rallying of women, not men, for equal rights. It makes sense 
that, having experienced life as female, women would be better equipped than males to advance 
their own gender’s priorities. There are a multitude of organizations, from non-profits to PACs 
(political action committees), dedicated to placing women in political office. Their assumption is 
clear: women in office are more likely to advocate on behalf of women in the general population.  
On the other hand, the democratic expectation that legislators represent all of their 
constituents’ substantive policy preferences – what legislative scholars term “dyadic 
representation” (Weissberg 1978) – has been a deep-seated value since the Founding (Miller and 
Stokes 1963). If female representatives advocate for women significantly more so than their male 
counterparts, as this paper attempts to determine, the idea of delegation breaks down. Americans 
tend to view representatives as delegates who will advocate on behalf of all of their constituents, 
  2 
since legislators are beholden to their district for the votes required for election. However, that 
advocacy may be more a condition of that representative’s shared personal characteristics with 
certain constituents than their willingness to promote the interests of the entire district’s 
population. If it is indeed correct that female legislators are best representative of women, it is 
not a far reach to assume that African Americans are best represented by African Americans, 
Catholics by Catholics, Hispanics by Hispanics, homosexuals by homosexuals, and so on and so 
forth. Viewing representation from this angle, the idea that each vote is equal, and as such, the 
faith and soundness behind the U.S. electoral system, begins to break down.  
There is indignation surrounding the imbalance between the proportion of women in 
office compared to their composition as half of the population. Although the number of women 
in the U.S. Congress has steadily risen over the past century, there are currently only 98 seats 
held by female legislators (CAWP 2014).  
 
Figure 1. The Proportion of Women in Congress Over Time 
This means women account for about 18% of Congressional seats (Figure 1). This gender 
imbalance is often seen not only as unfair, but harmful to the democratic process (Mansbridge 
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1999). Many scholars who research the impact of women in politics maintain that the election of 
more women to the U.S. Congress is not just a matter of equity, but would have a substantive 
policy impact (Swers 1998). In her book Why We lost the ERA, Jane Mansbrindge reasons 
“…descriptive representation by gender improves substantive outcomes for women in every 
polity for which we have a measure” (2005, 622). Sheryl Sandberg, in her book Lean In, echoes 
this sentiment, arguing, “conditions for all women will improve when there are women in 
leadership roles giving strong and powerful voice to their needs and concerns” (2013, 15). 
However, as I show below, the true policy impact of women in office is debated, making this 
paper all the more relevant if women’s numbers in office continue to climb. Although often 
stated matter-of-factly, the literature on the relationship between female legislators and greater 
representation of women is mixed. 
Literature Review 
The effect of gender on voting behavior in Congress 
Several studies have analyzed the effect of gender on ideology in congressional voting 
(Welch 1985, Vega & Firestone 1995, Schwindt-Bayer & Corbetta 2004, Simon & Palmer 2010, 
Frederick 2009). For the most part, these studies have found that, although political party is 
consistently the major determinant of liberalness or conservatism in voting behavior, gender still 
has an effect. This influence is particularly potent within parties, even after the analyses are 
adjusted for constituency characteristics and party affiliation.  
Welch (1985) was one of the first scholars to investigate the impact of gender on 
representation. Using Congressional Quarterly’s conservative coalition supports scores – a 
measure of conservatism – to analyze the U.S. House of Representatives from 1972 to 1980, she 
found that men were significantly more conservative than women, both generally and within 
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their respective political parties. Interestingly, Welch found that this difference between the 
genders in Congress has diminished over time, despite the growth in ideological disparity 
between men and women of the public. Importantly, the disparity between male representatives’ 
and female representatives’ ideology was greatly diminished, though still significant, upon 
controlling for constituency characteristics. In fact, Welch discovered that certain kinds of 
districts, such as northern and urban constituencies, or those that have higher proportions of 
immigrants or blacks in their populations, were more likely to elect a woman. She observed the 
greatest differences between female and male representative’s voting behaviors among 
Republicans and Southern Democrats; among Northern Democrats, the difference was 
insignificant.  Thus, even controlling for the district characteristics that some may argue account 
for any difference observed between the legislative behavior of female and male representatives, 
Welch found that gender has an effect on congressional voting choices.  
Vega & Firestone (1995) also used conservative coalition support scores for the U.S. 
House of Representatives in order to analyze voting behavior from 1981 to 1992. The authors 
found that although female legislators had voting patterns that were more liberal, these patterns 
were not significantly different from those of their male counterparts (the authors noted that 
given so few women in Congress at the time, significant coefficients were less likely to be 
obtained). Upon breaking down this time period, however, Vega & Firestone ultimately agreed 
with Welch (1985) in finding that certain years did reveal statistically significant differences 
among male and female members of Congress.  
This observed gender disparity in political ideology was further enhanced when 
examining differences between male and female co-partisans: Republican women were found to 
be significantly more liberal than Republican men throughout the interval. Observing bill 
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introductions in the House of Representatives by gender, the authors found that the proportion of 
women-related legislation enacted by women increased as the number of women increased. 
Further supporting Welch’s findings, Vega & Firestone concluded that party, constituency, and 
district characteristics bettered predicted congressional voting behavior than gender did.  
Frederick (2009) sought to confirm if female representatives were still generally more 
liberal in a more “polarized era,” referencing the rise of “women of the new right” who were 
“more in line with the GOP mainstream than Republican women in previous eras” (182). To 
address this recent evolution, Frederick analyzed the roll call voting behavior of women in the 
U.S. House of Representatives from the 97th through 10th Congresses (1981-2006), controlling 
for the members’ party and the districts’ demographic characteristics. He found that women in 
the House were “more divided along partisan and ideological lines” during this period than ever 
before, even more so than their male colleagues (2009, 181). Moreover, he discovered that, in 
contrast to previous research (Welch 1985, Vega and Firestone 1995, Clark 1998), female House 
Republicans were ideologically indistinguishable from their male counterparts. Frederick 
ultimately hypothesized that, given the advancing polarization between the party’s bases, it was 
unlikely that greater descriptive representation of women would translate into differences in 
substantive representation.  
Michele Swers (1998) is one of the few authors who have attempted to isolate the impact 
of gender on women’s issue bills. She did so by analyzing representative’s voting records for a 
total of fourteen bills during the “Year of the Woman,” the 103rd Congress (437). Controlling for 
representatives’ personal characteristics, party, and ideology, as well as regional and 
constituency factors, Swers found that gender “[exerted] substantial influence” on legislators’ 
votes on women’s issues overall (440). By organizing the bills by issue area, Swers determined 
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that the most notable impact of gender was on votes concerning reproductive issues. Like Vega 
& Firestone, Swers found that gender played a much more significant role in the voting behavior 
of Republican women, who defected from their party’s typical conservative stance to vote in 
favor of certain women’s-issue bills.  
Controlling for specific demographic, regional, and political characteristics within the 
Congressional districts, she refuted Schwindt-Bayer & Corbetta’s assertion that member 
differences attributed to gender can simply be explained by constituency preferences – that is, 
the tendency of certain districts to elect women because of the population’s own priorities. 
Echoing findings from other studies, Swers conceded that the effect of representatives’ gender on 
voting behavior was overwhelmed by “ideological, partisan, and district factors,” once bills 
involving reproductive issues were eliminated from the analysis (1998, 443).  
In narrowed research similar to that of Swers, Gerrity, Osborn & Mendez (2007) used the 
predecessor-successor method to assess whether female House members who replaced male 
House members of the same party were more likely to introduce bills dealing with women’s 
issues. Using detailed data concerning sponsorship and floor remarks from the 105th through 
107th Congresses, the authors examined 37 predecessor-successor pairs. They concluded that 
women of both parties, upon replacing men, were indeed more likely to sponsor such legislation, 
even after controlling for district-level effects.  
Schwindt-Bayer & Corbetta (2004) expressed concern that studies suggesting these 
results – the significant effect of gender on voting behavior – could be misleading due to 
insufficient controls for constituency influences. While it may have appeared that female 
representatives voted more liberally than did their male counterparts, Schwindt-Bayer & 
Corbetta argued that this behavior was simply a “function of the fact that women [tended] to be 
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elected in more liberal districts.” Examining congressional turnover data, the authors controlled 
for constituency in order to better isolate the effect, if any, of gender on potential policy-making, 
addressing the problem of endogeneity.   
Assuming that the composition of a given district was unlikely to vary greatly during two 
consecutive congresses, the effects of a constituency could be thought of as constant over time. 
Using this “Turnover Model” for the 103rd, 104th, and 105th Congresses, and DW-NOMINATE 
scores (a measure of liberalism or conservatism) the authors found that gender turnover had no 
significant effect on voting behavior. Whether a male replaced a female or a female replaced a 
male in the congressional office was of no consequence; when constituency preferences were 
held constant, differences in roll-call voting scores remained insignificant. 
Simon & Palmer (2010) pursued a two-step strategy in evaluating differences in the 
voting behavior of the men and women in Congress. For the first analysis, they averaged Poole 
and Rosenthal’s ideology scores for 36 Congresses, compared them by gender, and found that 
women were indeed more liberal than men. This disparity not only held within both political 
parties, but also persisted over time. Like Schwindt-Bayer & Corbetta, Simon & Palmer believed 
that the key to understanding congressional voting was the “fundamental relationship between 
members and their districts” (2010, 229). The authors thus all accounted for district influence by 
employing the same natural experiment in the second part of their research, in which the 
representative for a given constituency changed gender from one Congressional session to 
another, to determine the effect of gender on voting behavior.  
Using this method, Simon & Palmer found that female successors were not more liberal 
than their male predecessor in either party. Conceding that the low number of predecessor-
successors pairs rendered the probability of significance small, they nevertheless concluded that 
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the sex of the member did not produce shifts in liberalism within either party. Analyzing 
interparty change did not yield any significant sex-based differences either; it simply confirmed 
that ideological changes associated with shifts in partisan office were substantial (as expected), 
but had nothing to do with the gender of either the successor or predecessor.  
Furthermore, the authors found that it took a specific type of district to elect a woman, 
one that possessed a distinct demographic profile from those that elect men. Simon & Palmer 
determined that a “particular configuration of characteristics” resulted in “women friendly 
districts,” which were to credit in electing more liberal candidates (who may or may not be 
women) (2010, 243). They concluded that the difference in voting behavior between male and 
female members of the U.S. House of Representatives was a function not of sex, but of the 
constituencies the individuals represented.   
Griffin, Newman, and Wolbrecht (2012) were the first researchers to evaluate the “dyadic 
policy representation experienced by women” by comparing U.S. House members’ roll-call 
votes with the policy preferences of both their male and female constituents. In order to ascertain 
whether women’s preferences are not as well represented as those of male constituents by their 
own legislators, and also to determine the factors (such as the politician’s gender or party) that 
improve or weaken that representation, the authors examined the degree of congruence between 
citizens’ expressed ideological and policy preferences and their own representative’s roll-call 
voting behavior. They determined constituency preferences using the National Annenberg 
Election Surveys (NAES), which asked respondents questions on subjects comparable to the 11 
issue areas of the 19 bills included in the data. Constituents were classified as “winners” or 
“losers” on each vote, depending on whether their opinion aligned with the legislator’s choice. 
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These tallies were compiled into an overall “proximity” value, a measure of how much the 
ideology of a constituent differs from that of his or her representative.  
Generally, the authors found that women do not experience unequal dyadic policy 
representation in the House of Representatives. However, they discovered a sizeable gap in 
representation favoring men in districts governed by Republicans, and a similarly sized gap 
favoring women in districts represented by Democrats. A Democratic majority in the House 
further improved women’s representation relative to men. Interestingly, once the authors 
controlled for co-partisanship between constituents and representatives, representative party 
affiliation, majority party, and district characteristics, they found that having a female 
representative did not boost women’s “win ratios,” or substantive representation in the House.  
They concluded that descriptive representation makes no difference to the relative 
representation of women. Nevertheless, given that women tend to be elected in districts with a 
unique set of characteristics (e.g., both male and female constituents are more liberal), Griffin et 
al. noted that female representatives may indeed differ from their male colleagues in terms of 
ideological positions. But in acting upon those beliefs, these female legislators improve the 
dyadic representation experienced by constituents of both genders, thereby having no affect on 
the gender gap in relative representation.  
 
Summary 
Many of the aforementioned studies on gender and ideology show that, although party is the 
single most significant variable in predicting voting behavior, gender still has a slight effect “at 
the margins” (Schwindt-Bayer & Corbetta 2004, 223). In other words, male and female 
Democrats vote liberally, just as male and female Republican vote conservatively, but women 
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within each party are more liberal than their male partisan colleagues (Welch 1985, Vega and 
Firestone 1995, Clark 1998). The very general conclusion drawn from these studies is that 
female representatives are more liberal than male representatives in their roll call voting behavior. 
However, the Turnover Model has consistently failed to produce a significant relationship 
between gender and voting behavior, leading to the conclusion that, in terms of policy impact, 
the gender of the legislator has no effect when constituency preferences were held constant. The 
literature regarding female representatives and women’s issues in Congress is far less developed, 
but maintains that women in office are more likely to sponsor and vote for bills advancing 
women’s issues, no matter which econometric approach is taken.  
 
A Different Approach 
Almost all of the previous literature attempts to discern the policy impact of women only by 
analyzing the difference in roll call voting between male and female officeholders. However, 
these results do not aid us in understanding whether a significant difference, if any, in voting 
behavior between men and women in Congress translates into better representation for women in 
society. Oftentimes this conclusion is reached transitively, with authors arguing that, because 
women in Congress appear to be more liberal, and women in society are more likely to be liberal 
as well, women are better represented when there are more female legislators. The only 
exception is Griffin et al., who link Congressional roll call votes to survey responses focusing on 
similar issues.  
This paper takes a more direct approach in evaluating female representatives’ 
representation of women, comparing legislators’ specific roll call votes on specific proposal to 
their constituents’ opinions of those same issues in order to determine whether female legislators 
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are more likely than their male counterparts to reflect the views of female constituents. I 
therefore fill a gap in the literature by refining the measure of representation to include only 
preferences and actions by constituents and legislators over clearly defined issues.  
Theoretical Framework 
Representative democracy, the system of governance in the United States, is based on the 
principle of elected officials representing a group of people. The two models often used to 
describe representative democracy are the trustee model and delegate model (Pitkin 1967). The 
trustee model allows representatives greater autonomy, permitting them to make decisions 
actually going against the interests of their constituents, than the delegate model, which requires 
representatives act as a mouthpiece for the wishes of their constituency. Obviously, these two 
models place contradictory demands on representatives.  
Considering the delegate model, one could argue that representatives may not act in 
accordance to their entire constituency’s interests, but simply to those who elected them. In other 
words, the legislator may act as a mouthpiece for Republicans or Democrats, depending on the 
party in office. Effects of this copartisanship could be misconstrued as the effects of shared 
gender, if women in the public belonged to the same party as women in office. I therefore control 
for copartisanship, arguing that my hypothesis – that female legislators represent the preferences 
of women in their constituency to a greater degree than do male legislators – extends beyond the 
influence of party. Again, if we believe that representatives may act as delegates for just certain 
factions of their constituency, this hypothesis is supported by the idea that women in office will 
act as representatives for women in their constituency.  
My hypothesis that female representatives are more likely to represent the views of 
female constituents may also be understood through the trustee model of representation, in which 
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legislators are entrusted with the responsibility of making decisions for the ‘greater good,’ as 
opposed to following the explicit preferences of their constituents. If an individual’s personal 
characteristics, such as religion, income, education, and the factor integral to my analysis – 
gender – impact his or her idea of what is ultimately right and wrong, or influences his or her 
personal perceptions of the ‘common good,’ my hypothesis then follows that a woman entrusted 
by her constituency to represent as she sees fit will systematically differ from a man charged 
with the same responsibility. 
In her pioneering work, The Concept of Representation, Pitkin outlined four concepts of 
representation that parallel the discussion above: formal representation, symbolic representation, 
descriptive representation, and substantive representation (1967). Formal representation refers to 
the “institutional arrangements that precede and initiate representation” (Dovi 2011). Symbolic 
representation includes the manners in which a representative “stands for” the represented; in the 
context of this paper (Dovi 2011), symbolic representation refers to the figurative meaning that a 
female legislator has for female constituents. Rather than view the representation of women as a 
single-dimension concept, Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler proposed an integrated model linking 
formal, descriptive, substantive, and symbolic forms that are closely interconnected (2005). 
Nevertheless, my theoretical framework focuses on the interplay between descriptive and 
substantive representation.  
The theory behind descriptive representation maintains that the shared characteristics and 
experiences held by congresswomen may cause them to have different views and priorities than 
congressmen (Schwindt-Bayer & Corbetta 2004). This common background may or may not 
translate into substantive representation, or the advocacy on behalf of groups that share certain 
characteristics. If we accept the idea that representatives, particularly women, act both as 
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individuals and as groups, then it easier to understand how possessing the characteristic of 
‘female’ may lead women in Congress to act collectively – in a way that is different from their 
male counterparts – in “making a difference” for the women they represent (Vega & Firestone 
1995). I therefore expect that the descriptive representation by women in office, who possess 
shared traits that men lack with their female constituents, results in an increase in substantive 
representation of women in society.  
Conceptual Model 
 There are several factors that could plausibly affect how a representative in Congress 
votes. A legislator’s party, constituents and even congressional experience may all influence the 
decisions politicians make in office. The district is of particular interest when dissecting the act 
of representation, because the legislator, in theory, adheres to the preferences of his or her 
constituents. Among all of the potential factors that impact a representative’s vote on a given bill 
(e.g., party affiliation and personal demographic characteristics), I analyze the impact of the 
district (Figure 2).  
Specifically, within the district, I examine the relationship between female constituents’ 
views and the votes cast by their representatives. While I do not claim that the opinions held by 
female constituents are the most influential determinant of voting behavior, I hypothesize that 
shared gender between female constituents and their female representative does result in a 
significantly greater likelihood of congruence (that is, agreement in preferences) than that of 
male representatives with their female constituents.  
Thus, in this conceptual model, gender affects both how constituents view political issues 
and how representatives vote. Shared gender (e.g., between female constituents and their female 
representatives), I posit, is the source of greater political agreement, and is therefore the main 
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analysis in my conceptual and empirical models. However, the threat of omitted-variable bias 
begs us to consider whether other factors influence how men and women vote in both the district 
and the House of Representatives. Notably absent thus far from an analysis of political 
representation is the role of political party. Party affiliation, whether citizens and representatives 
identify as Republicans or Democrats, obviously affects district preferences and legislative 
behavior. Intuitively, the quality of representation enjoyed by constituents (measured by how 
often their legislators’ voting reflects their preferences) who share the political party of their 
representative is higher than those who differ from their elected official in terms of political 
affiliation.  
 
Figure 2: Conceptual Model Graphic 
 
Yet, there is also reason to believe that party affiliation is a confounding variable in my 
conceptual model, analyzing the effect of shared gender between representatives and constituents, 
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specifically. Evidence suggests that women of all ages are more likely to be democrats than are 
males (Newport 2009). In the three Congressional Sessions that I analyze in this paper, there are 
over twice as many female democrats than female republicans in the House of Representatives. 
For this reasoning, I control for shared political affiliation between constituents and their elected 
officials in my conceptual model. Otherwise, I may misattribute to shared gender what is actually 
the effect of shared political party.   
Of course, there is a multitude of factors that could arguably influence both how 
constituents feel on any given issue and how represents vote on certain bills. For example, 
demographic characteristics, such as race, income, and religion, may result in attitudes, 
preferences, and values that form the opinions of both the public and politicians.  However, these 
characteristics do not differ systematically based on gender. Therefore, their exclusion is unlikely 
to produce bias in my model.  
Data 
In order to discern the relative degree to which the views of male and female constituents 
are represented by their legislator’s voting, I need data on legislative votes that include three 
variables: (i) how the legislator voted; (ii) how female voters wanted the legislator to vote on the 
issue; and (iii) how male voters wanted the legislator to vote on the issue. The first variable is 
simple to find, given that the U.S. House of Representatives’ roll call votes are public record. 
However, the second and third variables are more difficult to uncover, as the personal 
preferences of constituents regarding specific issues are not as readily available.  
Data for the second two types of variables are from the 2008, 2010 and 2012 Cooperative 
Congressional Election Study Common Content Survey. These surveys ask questions on specific 
bills that were put to a floor vote in the House of Representatives during that congressional term. 
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Specifically, the survey asks respondents whether they support or oppose certain pieces of 
legislation on which their own representative voted. Also recorded through the CCES Common 
Content Surveys is the respondent’s gender and congressional district. The Cooperative 
Congressional Election Study further compiles data of the roll call votes for the same bills it 
includes in the Common Content Survey, recording the House of Representatives member, his or 
her state and congressional district, party, gender and voting decisions (as for, against, or no 
vote) on the same bills evaluated by CCES Common Content Survey respondents. I therefore am 
able to directly couple data of public opinion by gender for each district regarding specific bills 
with data on roll call voting for the same bills from the House of Representatives’ 110th, 111th, 
and 112th Congressional terms.  
 
Survey Information and Methodology  
The Cooperative Congressional Election Study Common Content Survey is a 30,000+ 
person national stratified sample survey administered by YouGov Polimetrix. The sampling 
method uses matched random sample methodology, in which numerous demographic variables 
are used to match respondents to an individual in the “target sample,” a true probability sample 
that is representative of all adults.  The result is a sample of respondents who have the same 
measured characteristics as the representative target sample, which establishes confidence in the 
CCES Common Content Survey results. 
The questionnaire consists of five parts: 1) sample identifiers (including state and 
congressional district); 2) profile questions (largely demographic); 3) pre-election questions; 4) 
post-election questions, an; 5) contextual data (including candidate names and parties, election 
results, and roll call votes). For the purposes of this paper, my analysis was limited to the sample 
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identifiers section and pre-election questions, which recorded respondents’ gender, congressional 
voting district, and opinions on nine specific Congressional bills. The survey covers men and 
women from each congressional district in every state,  
I used the 2008, 2010, and 2012 CCES Common Content Surveys, because these were 
the surveys that had matching roll call voting data sets from the relevant congressional session. 
The 2008, 2010, and 2012 CCES surveys had response rates of .468, .404, and .345 overall. The 
Common Content sections for each year asked questions about five to nine bills.  
 
Dependent Variables 
Representative Vote, by Gender 
The Cooperative Congressional Election Study compiled data sets for the 110th, 111th, and 112th 
congressional terms, in which the House of Representatives roll call votes of the bills, also 
included in the 2008, 2010, and 2012 CCES Common Content Surveys, are recorded. The data 
sets consist of the names of members in the House that term, their state and district, their gender, 
and whether they were for, against, or did not vote on the bills. I recoded the three types of string 
observations, “For,” “Against” and “Did Not Vote,” into 1, 0 and missing, respectively, creating 
a binary variable for each bill that demonstrates support (coded as 1) versus opposition (coded as 
zero) by each member of the House. My analysis includes a total of 20 bills voted on in the 
House of Representatives from 2008-2013. This data on the voting record and gender of each 
member therefore allows me to create the two binary output variables – whether a female 
representative supports a bill and whether a male representative supports a bill – found in the two 
empirical equations discussed below.  
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Independent Variables 
District Majority Support, by Gender  
The Cooperative Congressional Election Study Comment Content Surveys administered 
in 2008, 2010, and 2012 asked over 30,000 subjects their opinions about bills covering topics 
from foreign affairs to health insurance to gay marriage. The bills were explained in a sentence 
(e.g., “Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act – Allow U.S. spy agencies to eavesdrop on overseas 
terrorist suspects without first getting a court order”) and respondents were told to state whether 
they supported or opposed the legislation. They could also skip the question.  
The CCES Common Content data sets consist of information on the respondent’s state, 
district number, gender, and policy opinions. I used the state and district variables to generate a 
new variable representing unique congressional voting districts, allowing me to sort by and 
observe proportions of support for a bill within districts. This step was crucial, as my analysis is 
at the district level, tying the preferences of the constituents in a given district to the voting 
behavior of their representative. I recoded the 4 types of responses for each bill – Support, 
Oppose, Skip and Not Asked – into a binary variable (1, 0, and missing, respectively). With 
unique voting districts encompassing clear groups of men and women, as well as their 
preferences on certain bills, I was able to calculate the proportion of female constituents and 
male constituents per district who supported a given bill. These proportions were used to create 
binary variables indicating whether or not a majority of constituents supported a bill. If 50% or 
more of women in a given district supported a bill, the variable indicating female majority 
support for a bill was coded as 1. If less than 50% of men in a given district supported a bill, the 
other variable in my empirical equation – indicating male majority support for a bill – was coded 
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as 0. This information comprised the two independent binary variables of interest, producing 
coefficients β1 and β2, shown below.  
 
District Majority Support, by Party  
Having data regarding subjects’ political affiliation (i.e., Republican or Democrat), as 
well as their preferences on certain bills, I was able to calculate the proportion of Democratic 
constituents and Republican constituents per district who supported a given bill. These 
proportions were used to create binary variables indicating whether or not a majority of 
constituents in that party supported a bill. For example, if 50% or more of Democrats in a given 
district supported a bill, the variable indicating Democratic majority support for a bill was coded 
as 1. If less than 50% of Republicans in a given district supported a bill, the other party variable 
in my empirical equation – indicating Republican majority support for a bill – was coded as 0.  
 
District Proportion Support, by Gender  
When presenting the results, below, I argue that binary variables may not be the most 
revealing. I therefore replace in my equations the two binary indicators for majority support 
among men and women in the district with continuous variables, which demonstrate the 
proportion of men and women in the district who support a bill. 
 
District Majority Support, by Legislator’s Party 
The analysis ultimately suggests a new approach to controlling for the effects of shared 
political party between representatives and their constituents, which must be separated out from 
any impact of shared gender. Therefore, I replace the two indicators of majority support by party, 
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above, with a single binary variable representing whether a majority of the constituents of the 
party of the legislator (either Democrats or Republicans) favor the bill. This variable is coded as 
1 if the legislator is Democratic and the majority of his or her Democratic constituents support 
the bill, 1 if the legislator is Republican and the majority of his or her Republican constituents 
support the bill, and zero otherwise. 
 
Timing of Survey Concerns 
 Since the surveys were conducted throughout the year, it is important to consider the 
effect, if any, of instances when the legislature voted before the public was questioned. This 
timing raises the concern that a citizen’s response for an issue may be “influenced by the 
legislative vote on the same issue cast by his or her state representative” (Brunner et al 2013, 58). 
If this concern were valid, then respondents’ answers would not be a very good measure of 
public opinion. Alternatively, if women and men were influenced to a different degree by the 
votes of their representatives, then my results would be biased. However, according to Brunner 
et al, who analyzed California’s ballot propositions, this bias is unlikely for two reasons: voters 
do not view their representatives as being influential on how they vote, and they are unlikely to 
know how their state legislators voted. The 2006 CCES asked respondents how their senators 
voted on six high-profile issues during the 2005-2006 congressional session: stem cell research, 
Iraq withdrawal, immigration reform, minimum wage increase, capital gains tax increase, and the 
Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). The average of fraction of the sample that 
answered correctly regarding their representatives’ votes was only 49 percent. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
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I report the average percentage of the district population to support each bill included in 
the 2008, 2010 and 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Study survey, then breakdown this 
support by gender and political party in Tables 1-3. Also included in the following tables are the 
standard deviation, minimum and maximum percentage of support for each bill, by district, 
gender and party. Not one bill sees the same proportion of support by men and women, though 
the disagreement is greater over some issues than others, such as withdrawing troops from Iraq 
and increasing the minimum wage. These summary statistics also provide some support for 
including data on the preferences of each political party in the empirical equation, as Democrats 
and women, as well as Republicans and men, are always in the same direction in terms of 
support. For example, when the average proportion of women across districts who support a bill 
is less than the mean percentage of support by men, it is always the case that a smaller fraction of 
Democrats than Republicans support the bill as well. Likewise, in every instance in which a 
greater percentage of men than women across districts support a bill, a larger proportion of 
Republicans than Democrats express support for that bill. Although the actual percentages of 
support among women and Democrats, as well as men and Republicans, differ substantially in 
some cases, this consistent agreement of direction suggests a gender-party relationship legitimate 
enough to include in my empirical model.  
 Since I analyze the voting choices of male and female representatives as a function of the 
preferences of men and women in the district, it is obviously integral to my analysis that 
constituents vary to some degree in their political preferences by gender. I therefore include 
visual aids in the form of graphs 3-5 that illustrate the level of disagreement between males and 
females over each bill included in the 2008, 2010, and 2012 CCES survey. I include identical 
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graphs that demonstrate the difference in female versus male opinion in the House of 
Representatives during the 110th, 111th and 112th Congress (Figures 6-8, respectively). 
 %  
District 
Support 
% 
Female 
Support 
% 
Male 
Support 
% 
Democratic 
Support 
% 
Republican 
Support 
Withdraw Troops From Iraq      
Mean 54.63 63.05 46.22 89.57 13.96 
Standard Deviation 11.7 12.88 14.08 6.52 9.05 
Minimum 22.22 24.24 14.29 61.11 0 
Maximum 96.97 100 100 100 75 
 
Increase The Minimum Wage 
     
Mean 78.08 86.39 69.1 96.62 53.5 
Standard Deviation 7.91 7.42 11.66 3.64 12.63 
Minimum 52.94 56 25 77.78 0 
Maximum 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Funding Stem Cell Research 
     
Mean 64.23 66.43 61.98 89.56 35.2 
Standard Deviation 11.47 13.11 13.34 7.42 13.12 
Minimum 31.67 23.33 21.05 60 0 
Maximum 98.59 100 100 100 83.33 
 
Allow U.S. to Eavesdrop Overseas 
     
Mean 67.71 64.78 70.42 44.86 91.05 
Standard Deviation 10.47 12.89 11.61 12.74 6.98 
Minimum 24.19 8.33 25.93 11.76 25 
Maximum 88.14 93.1 93.33 80 100 
 
Children Health Insurance Program 
     
Mean 69.47 76.2 62.29 44.86 91.05 
Standard Deviation 9.88 10.18 13.5 12.73 6.98 
Minimum 45.45 47.37 20 11.76 25 
Maximum 100 100 100 80 100 
 
Ban Gay Marriage 
     
Mean 47.04 43.78 50.57 22.12 75.2 
Standard Deviation 12.9 14.8 14.53 12.37 12.78 
Minimum 4.08 0 3.7 0 0 
Maximum 85.71 78.79 95.24 100 100 
n 872 436 436 436 436 
Table 1: 2008 CCES Descriptive Statistics – support for bills by district, gender and party 
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 %  
District 
Support 
% 
Female 
Support 
% 
Male 
Support 
% 
Democratic 
Support 
% 
Republican 
Support 
Federal Assistance Housing Crisis      
Mean 51.23 57.92 44.59 71.44 29.3 
Standard Deviation 11.27 13.37 13.69 11.76 11.59 
Minimum 22.22 22.22 5.88 23.08 0 
Maximum 94.74 100 87.5 100 100 
 
Extend NAFTA 
     
Mean 48.34 46.99 49.68 42.02 56.7 
Standard Deviation 9.85 14.29 11.29 14.37 13.88 
Minimum 24.44 0 20.59 0 17.86 
Maximum 79.55 100 88.89 100 100 
 
Bank Bailout 
     
Mean 27.9 28.72 27.2 35.95 21.78 
Standard Deviation 9.53 9.53 11.29 12.85 11.66 
Minimum 3.13 12.16 0 5.88 0 
Maximum 68.09 71.43 73.91 90 80 
      
n 872 436 436 436 436 
 
Table 1 (contd.): 2008 CCES Descriptive Statistics – support for bills by district, gender and 
party 
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 % 
District 
Support 
% 
Female 
Support 
%  
Male 
Support 
% 
Democratic 
Support 
% 
Republican 
Support 
American Recovery and 
Reinvestment 
     
Mean 49.79 56.34 42.75 85.57 12.66 
Standard Deviation 11.6 11.48 13.56 5.96 7.23 
Minimum 27.08 31.03 10.53 61.7 0 
Maximum 84.75 91.67 88.24 100 83.33 
 
State Children's Health Insurance  
     
Mean 70.14 77.43 62.2 94.18 43.97 
Standard Deviation 8.14 7.97 10.38 3.6 9.78 
Minimum 52.5 54.35 36.11 74.36 18.75 
Maximum 94.12 98.21 96 100 83.33 
 
American Clean Energy and 
Security 
     
Mean 75.14 83.12 66.44 97.65 50.21 
Standard Deviation 7.87 7.32 10.29 2.39 9.68 
Minimum 56.57 58 38.89 87.18 25 
Maximum 96.72 100 100 100 83.33 
 
Comprehensive Health Reform  
     
Mean 50.76 57.53 43.39 88.8 10.96 
Standard Deviation 12.33 12.69 13.55 5.71 7.06 
Minimum 23.08 27.91 15.52 58.97 0 
Maximum 94.74 97.22 90.91 100 66.67 
 
Financial Reform 
     
Mean 68.11 73.07 62.85 93.78 40.28 
Standard Deviation 8.71 8.69 11.01 3.93 8.6 
Minimum 47.33 50 35.42 78.95 15.38 
Maximum 92.68 97.92 100 100 80 
 
End Don't Ask, Don't Tell 
     
Mean 58.7 66.52 50.4 85.22 30.39 
Standard Deviation 10.19 10.32 12.47 7.52 9.65 
Minimum 28.89 31.37 20.59 54.84 5.88 
Maximum 89.09 95.12 86.36 100 75 
 
n 
 
872 
 
436 
 
436 
 
436 
 
436 
 
Table 2: 2010 CCES Descriptive Statistics – support for bills by district, gender and party 
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 %  
District 
Support 
%  
Female 
Support 
%  
Male 
Support 
%  
Democratic 
Support 
%  
Republican 
Support 
Repeal of ACA      
Mean 43.99 39% 49% 17% 78% 
Standard Deviation 9% 10% 12% 7% 8% 
Minimum 11% 3% 13% 0% 38% 
Maximum 64% 62% 77% 44% 100% 
 
Ryan Budget 
     
Mean 19% 14% 24% 8% 33% 
Standard Deviation 5% 5% 7% 5% 10% 
Minimum 6% 3% 5% 0% 8% 
Maximum 34% 33% 47% 28% 100% 
 
US-Korea Free 
Trade 
     
Mean 51% 45% 57% 49% 55% 
Standard Deviation 6% 7% 8% 8% 10% 
Minimum 34% 22% 30% 23% 0% 
Maximum 73% 63% 81% 76% 88% 
 
Simpson-Bowles 
Budget 
     
Mean 49% 46% 52% 48% 52% 
Standard Deviation 6% 7% 7% 8% 10% 
Minimum 33% 28% 29% 25% 0% 
Maximum 69% 76% 77% 74% 100% 
 
Keystone Pipeline 
     
Mean 73% 70% 77% 60% 90% 
Standard Deviation 7% 8% 9% 9% 7% 
Minimum 44% 34% 45% 32% 0% 
Maximum 88% 89% 94% 82% 100% 
 
n 
 
872 
 
436 
 
436 
 
436 
 
436 
 
Table 3: 2012 CCES Descriptive Statistics – support for bills by district, gender and party 
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Figure 3: Gender Differences in Policy Opinions – 2008 CCES 
 
Figure 4: Gender Differences in Political Attitudes – 110th Congress, House of Representatives 
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Figure 5: Gender Differences in Policy Opinions – 2010 CCES 
  
Figure 6: Gender Differences in Political Attitudes – 111th Congress, House of Representatives  
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Figure 7: Gender Differences in Policy Opinions – 2012 CCES 
 
Figure 8: Gender Differences in Political Attitudes – 112th Congress, House of Representatives 
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Empirical Model  
The goal of my investigation is to describe how legislative representation varies by 
gender. I answer this using the two approaches executed by Brunner et al., characterizing the 
extent to which legislative voting represents certain constituents’ views both on average and “on 
the margin” (2013, 63).  
 
Representation “On Average” 
First, I analyze whether legislators are more likely to vote with one gender group than 
another. To answer this question, I assess the congruence, a value indicating the extent to which 
a representative’s vote matches the beliefs held by the majority of their district (Brunner et al., 
2013), between the legislators’ votes and the policy preferences of their female and male 
constituents, respectively. I calculate the congruence by comparing roll call votes in the U.S. 
House of Representatives to stated constituent opinions, measuring the fraction of instances in 
which male and female legislators vote in accordance with the preferences of women and men in 
their district. I combine these results from each district (e.g., the proportion of time Female 
Representative X voted with the majority of women in her district, plus the proportion of time 
Female Representative Y voted with the majority of women in her district, and so on) and 
compute the average likelihood (i.e., my congruence value) that female legislators vote with their 
female constituents. I repeat this process to determine my four congruence values of interest: the 
proportion of time female legislators vote with respect to the majority of men and the majority of 
women, as well as the proportion of time male legislators vote with respect to the majority of 
men and the majority of women. I also include congruence measures for female and male 
legislators with their Democratic and Republican constituents. 
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This method amalgamates voting behavior by gender across the House of Representatives 
and the United States, allowing for a larger-scale analysis. In this way, I demonstrate whether 
legislators’ propensity to vote with their gender groups varies significantly. I hypothesize that 
female legislators will demonstrate greater congruence with their female constituents than with 
their male constituents, that male legislators with have larger congruence with their male 
constituents over their female constituents, and that these gender differences will be statistically 
significant. I also expect that the congruence value between female legislators and their female 
constituents will be greater than the congruence between male legislators and their female 
constituents, and that this difference will be statistically significant.  
Representation “On the Margin” 
The second method by which I illustrate the relative representation by gender is by 
demonstrating congruence “on the margin” (Brunner et al. 2013). I run a legislative decision 
model to predict the legislator’s propensity to support a bill, using the majority view of both 
male and female constituents as explanatory variables. In these two regressions (one for male 
legislators, one for female legislators), the output variable is binary, demonstrating whether or 
not a representative of the given gender voted yes or no on a given bill in the House of 
Representatives. The two independent variables are also binary, with the first showing whether 
or not the majority of female constituents in a district supported a given bill and the second 
showing whether or not the majority of male constituents in a district supported a given bill. 
These variables take the form of Equation 1: 
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(1) 
i. 
Female_Legislator_Voting_Yes = 
β0 + β1(Majority_Female_Constituents_Support) + β2(Majority_Male_Constituents_Support) 
and 
ii. 
Male_Legislator_Voting_Yes = 
β0 + β1(Majority_Female_Constituents_Support) + β2(Majority_Male_Constituents_Support) 
 
… Where [Gender]_Legislator_Voting _Yes is an indicator for whether the legislator supported 
or opposed a piece of legislation, and Majority_Female_Constituents_Support and 
Majority_Male_Constituents_Support are indicators for whether the majority of female and male 
constituents supported the legislation. The coefficients β1 and β2 then measure the degree to 
which the female and male constituents “influence” the legislator’s vote. If β1 − β2 > 0, this is 
evidence that the legislator weighs his or her female constituents’ opinions more heavily in the 
decision function. If β1 − β2 < 0, this suggests that male constituents are more influential. We 
employ indicators for constituent view rather than continuous measures here so that the 
interpretation of β1 (or β2) is the marginal impact of the median female (or male) voter’s support 
for the legislation. 
As stated when describing my conceptual model, it is necessary to control for the effects 
of political party in this analysis on the impact of shared gender on representation. Since there is 
evidence that political party does vary systematically by gender, a significant coefficient in one 
of the above equations, such as β1 or α1, which signals an effect of female constituents’ opinions 
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on representatives’ voting behavior, could actually be picking up the effect of shared gender. It 
would therefore be presumptuous to conclude that, if, say, β1 > β2 in equation (1)i, above, female 
representatives placed greater weight in the opinions of their female constituents (i.e., my entire 
hypothesis). Thus, in order to more confidently prove or disprove the political consequences of 
shared gender between constituents and their representatives, I amend the previous two equations 
in the following way, to account for the influence of shared party: 
(2) 
i. 
Female_Legislator_Voting_Yes = 
β0 + β1(Majority_Female_Constituents_Support) + β2(Majority_Male_Constituents_Support) + 
β3(Majority_Democratic_Constituents_Support) + 
β4(Majority_Republican_Constituents_Support) 
and 
ii. 
Male_Legislator_Voting_Yes = 
β0 + β1(Majority_Female_Constituents_Support) + β2(Majority_Male_Constituents_Support) + 
β3(Majority_Democratic_Constituents_Support) + 
β4(Majority_Republican_Constituents_Support) 
… Where Majority_Democratic_Constituents_Support and 
Majority_Republican_Constituents_Support are controls, indicating whether the majority of 
Democratic and Republican constituents, respectively, supported the legislation. I also complete 
3 more regression models, including fixed effects for the year, bill and state.  
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Since it is possible that the correlation between men and women in terms of majority 
support for certain policies may be quite high, the equations above may not reveal the greatest 
extent to which shared gender between constituents and legislators has an effect on political 
representation. Therefore, instead of observing all issues collectively, as above, I find the bills 
over which women and men had the highest levels of disagreement, indicated by their CCES 
survey responses. I categorize bills as high or low disagreement based on the difference in mean 
support between the genders. Those bills over which male and female voters throughout the 
country greatly disagreed (over the 75th percentile of disagreement) are included in this more 
restricted analysis. In my data, the bills over the 75th percentile of disagreement were those that 
had a difference in mean female-male opinion of 16.3% and above.  
After restricting the data to only contentious bills, I repeat the steps above. First, I 
compile the average congruence by legislator and constituent gender, including congruence 
between female and male legislators with political parties at the district level as well. I then run 
the regressions in the two sets of equations above: first, the simple equation, only analyzing the 
effect of share gender, then the second equation, including political party controls.  
It is necessary to add in fixed effects to my models as well. Since I pool data from the 
2008, 2010 and 2012 CCES (and, correspondingly, from the 110th, 111th and 112th Congressional 
sessions), I included fixed effects for year. This step is important, as the political climate, even 
with respect to gender, changes from year to year. For example, 2012 was dubbed by some 
political commentators as the “year of the woman,” as women, their priorities and their voting 
behavior became a major element of the presidential election. Therefore, any unobserved 
changes from year to year are controlled for by adding in year fixed effects, such that 
comparisons are not being erroneously drawn across distinct time periods.  
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It is also necessary to include fixed effects for the type of bill being analyzed. As 
demonstrated in the descriptive statistics, women and men disagree over some political issues 
more than others. Intuitively, it is expected that more women than men will support so-called 
“women’s issue” bills, such as those focusing on reproductive health and family policy. As a 
result, any impact of shared gender between constituents and their representatives may only 
occur for certain bills, or at least more so for certain bills. It is therefore important to hold the 
type of bill constant when interpreting the influence of gender on representation in my model.  
 The last set of fixed effects I include in my model are those for state. There is obviously 
regional political variation that could affect the relationship that representatives have with their 
constituents by gender. For example, women in certain parts of the country may be more vocal in 
their political preferences. The unobserved factors that conspire to elect more women in certain 
states over others are also critical variables for which to control.  
The reasoning behind these fixed effects is best understood through specific examples. 
Since my analysis is at the district level, I will show, through comparing two distinct 
congressional districts, the need for the fixed effects that I include in my model. Without fixed 
effects, the model technically includes all three years, twenty bills and fifty states in the analysis, 
allowing for a great deal of unexplained variation. In the model controlling for political party 
with fixed effects for year, the regression becomes slightly more specific, presenting two districts 
from potentially two different states and focusing on possibly two different bills, but in the same 
year, such as 2010. This model incorporates the congruence demonstrated between a 
representative and his or her constituents in an Arizona district regarding a bill on gay rights with 
that from a district in Maine that focuses on health reform, both in 2010. Controlling for the type 
of bill brings us closer to the ideal controlled state: now, the coefficients on the gender variables 
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can be interpreted as referring to the same bill (e.g., health reform) in the same year (e.g., 2010), 
but still in different regions (e.g., Arizona and Maine). In the last model, which contains fixed 
effects for year, bill and state, the results have more reliability, as the analysis focuses on the 
relationship between constituents and their representatives in the same year and state for the 
same bills.  
Taken together, these measures of average and marginal congruence describe both how 
frequently legislators vote in accordance with gender groups and also how likely the legislator is 
to favor one group over the other, particularly when men and women disagree. 
 
Further analysis 
Party Control  
My initial results, below, indicate the need for slight amendments and changes to the 
empirical model displayed above. Therefore, after presenting and discussing the results from 
these equations, I change the means of party control, replacing the two variables that demonstrate 
majority support among Republicans and Democrats in a district with a single binary variable. 
This new variable, titled “Party Control,” accounts for the effect of the opinions held by the 
majority of a legislator’s own party on his or her vote. This component of the regression controls 
for the party of both the legislator and the constituents on the right-hand side of the equation, and 
thus demonstrates the relationship of shared party, just as I attempt to analyze the relationship of 
shared gender. The fixed-effects variables for year, bill and state remain the same as above in 
this new equation. 
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(3) 
i. 
Female_Legislator_Voting_Yes = 
β0 + β1(Majority_Female_Constituents_Support) + β2(Majority_Male_Constituents_Support) + 
β3(Majority_Legislator’s_Party_Support) 
and 
ii. 
Male_Legislator_Voting_Yes = 
β0 + β1(Majority_Female_Constituents_Support) + β2(Majority_Male_Constituents_Support) + 
β3(Majority_Legislator’s_Party_Support) 
 
Continuous Measures 
There is reason to doubt the suitability of binary independent variables in this analysis. 
This skepticism is best illustrated with an example: if 49% of females and 51% of males support 
a bill, the two independent variables of interest are coded differently (as 0 and 1, respectively), 
despite negligible difference. Yet, if 51% of females support a bill that 80% of males support, the 
two independent variables of interest would be coded as the same (as 1 and 1, respectively). This 
seems illogical. Therefore, I replace the binary indicators of majority male and female support 
with continuous measures, which represent the proportion of men and women in a district to 
support a bill.  
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(4) 
i. 
Female_Legislator_Voting_Yes = 
β0 + β1(Proportion_Female_Constituents_Support) + 
β2(Proportion_Male_Constituents_Support) + β3(Majority_Legislator’s_Party_Support) 
and 
ii. 
Male_Legislator_Voting_Yes = 
β0 + β1(Proportion_Female_Constituents_Support) + 
β2(Proportion_Male_Constituents_Support) + β3(Majority_Legislator’s_Party_Support) 
Results 
Representation “On Average” – Congruence 
Table 4 presents the average congruence between representatives and their constituents 
by gender, including congruence measures for legislators and their constituents’ parties as well. 
Female legislators in the House of Representatives voted in accordance to their female 
constituents’ preferences on the 20 bills studied nearly 65% of the time during the three 
Congressional sessions considered, whereas this proportion agreement was 61.53% with their 
male constituents, amounting to a significant difference. Conversely, male legislators in the 
House reflected the preferences of their male constituents more often than that of their female 
constituents, with a significant difference between the congruence values of 59.95% and 54.61%, 
respectively.  
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Unexpectedly, female legislators had a greater congruence with their male constituents 
than did male legislators. While the congruence between female legislators with their female 
constituents was significantly greater than the congruence between male legislators with their 
female constituents, the difference in congruence between the women and men in the House with 
their male constituents was insignificant. In other words, although each sex of representatives in 
the House votes according to the beliefs of their gender in the district, female representatives 
represent to a significantly larger degree the preferences of women, yet there is no significant 
gender difference in the representation of men by males or females in the House.  
 Legislator  
 Female Male F-test, p-value 
Women 
   
64.93 
(.013) 
54.61 
(.006) 0 
Men 
   
61.53 
(.013) 
59.95 
(.006) 0.264 
T-test of Equality, p-value  0.006 0  
Democrats 64.17 (.013) 
49.34 
(.006) 0 
Republicans 
   
38.26 
(.013) 
52.77 
(.006) 0 
T-test of Equality, p-value  0 0  
n 1440 7226  
    Table 4: Average Congruence by Gender and Party in the District and House of 
Representatives – All Bills 
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Female representatives also reflected the preferences of their Democratic constituents 
more frequently than those of their Republican constituents. The opposite was found was male 
legislators, who had significantly greater congruence with their Republican constituents than 
with their Democratic constituents. Moreover, women in Congress voted in accordance with 
Democrats in their districts significantly more often than do male representatives, while men in 
Congress agreed significantly more frequently than their female counterparts with Republican 
constituents.  
 
 Legislator  
 Female Male F-test, p-value 
 Women 
   
72.60  
(.023) 
54.53 
(.012) 
0 
 
Men 
   
69.86  
(.024) 
63.58 
(.011) 
0.023 
 
T-test of Equality, p-value 0.233 0  
Democrats 70.96  (.024) 
49.94 
(.012) 
0 
 
Republicans 
  
53.31 
(.012) 
 
44.39  
(.026) 0.002 
T-test of Equality, p-value  0 0.091  
n 365 
 
1812 
  
Table 5: Average Congruence by Gender and Party in the District and House of 
Representatives – Contentious Bills 
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 Table 5 restricts the average congruence analysis to only contentious bills, those over 
which men and women disagreed the most. Confining the data to these bills generally produces 
more extreme congruence statistics. Once again, female legislators vote in accordance to the 
preferences of their female constituents more often than those of their male constituents, 72.6% 
and 69.86%, respectively, though the difference is now insignificant. The congruence between 
male representatives and their male constituents is still greater than that with their female 
constituents, but this significant difference becomes greater upon restriction to only contentious 
bills. Female legislators still demonstrate greater representation of their female constituents 
opinions than do male legislators; this disparity is larger in the analysis of contentious bills, and 
remains significant. Interestingly, women in Congress still exhibit greater congruence with their 
male constituents than do men in Congress, though this larger difference now becomes 
significant.  
 A similar push to the extremes in Table 5 of the values from Table 4 is also exhibited by 
party congruence with both genders in Congress. Congresswomen reflect both Democratic and 
Republican preferences to a greater extent regarding contentious bills, though female 
representatives still demonstrate significantly greater congruence with Democrats in their 
districts than with Republicans. Once again, women in the House agree significantly more often 
with their Democratic constituents and significantly less often with their Republican constituents, 
than do men in the House. 
 Thus, “on average” both male and female legislators tend to represent the views of their 
own gender to a greater extent than those of the opposite sex. However, congresswomen 
consistently enjoy greater congruence with both their male and female constituents than do 
congressmen, who have lower “agreement rates” with both genders in their districts. 
  41 
Representation “On the Margin” – Regression Analysis  
All Bills 
Table 6 displays the results of the empirical equations above, showing representation “on 
the margin” using a linear probability model1. The first model is the simplest, including only 
indicators for whether or not the majority of women and the majority of men supported a bill as 
independent variables, shown as the first two variables on the left-hand side of the table. The 
dependent variable is represented in the first row and is an indicator for whether or not the 
representative, either male or female, voted for a bill. The statistics show that if the majority of 
women in any district nationwide support a bill, their female representative is 25.5 percentage 
points more likely to vote for that bill. If the majority of men in a district support a bill, their 
female representative is 11.3 percentage points more likely to vote for it. Since β1 − β2 > 0 in this 
simple legislative model, I conclude that female representatives weigh the preferences of their 
female constituents significantly more heavily than those of their male constituents. The opposite 
is true for male representatives, who appear to place more importance on the opinions of their 
male constituents. However, all else is not equal in this model, which does not yet control for the 
influence of political party nor contain the fixed effects discussed above. Nevertheless, this 
outcome provides a good start to the analysis, and suggests the direction in which the results may 
transpire.  
The story changes slightly upon controlling for party at the district level (Table 6, Model 
2). Although the coefficients on the indicators for majority of female and male support remain 
significant, the difference between the two is far smaller, and becomes insignificant when 
                                                 
1 Probit models were also used for this analysis, because the output variable is binary (i.e., 
restricted to 0 or 1). Tables akin to Tables 6 and 7 with the marginal effects from the Probit 
model are included in the appendix for reference. However, the results were nearly identical as in 
the linear probability model, shown below.   
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focusing on female representatives. Interestingly, the coefficient on the majority female support 
indicator is the only statistic to shrink upon controlling for party preferences. When the 
predominant opinions of Democrats and Republicans in a district are included in the equation, 
the support for a bill by the majority of women has only an 18-percentage point effect on the 
likelihood that a female representative will vote for a bill. Therefore, in Model 1, I may have 
been overstating the effect of shared female gender on representation, possibly because more 
women are Democrats than not. Indeed, support of a bill by the majority of Democrats by district 
relates to a significant 5-percentage point increase in the likelihood that female representatives 
will vote for a bill. Given the imbalance in female composition among Democrats and 
Republicans, it may not be surprising that support for a bill by the majority of Republicans in a 
district significantly decreases the likelihood that a female representative will vote “Aye” by 16.9 
percentage points. Yet, every other coefficient, in both gender’s equations, grow upon 
controlling for political party preferences in Model 2. It is important to keep in mind that these 
results include variation in year, state and bill, and thus may not be the most refined.  
In the second model, majority support by men for a bill increases the chance that a male 
representative will vote in favor by 21.8 percentage points, while the same support among 
women has an effect of only 9.8 percentage points. While we cannot statistically conclude that 
congresswomen are more influenced by the beliefs of their female constituents in the second 
model, we can still conclude that congressmen statistically differ in their representation of men 
and women in their district, significantly favoring the majority preferences of men, though at a 
smaller margin. Regarding Democratic support, we see an opposite effect than that on female 
representatives: male representatives are 15.2 percentage points less likely to vote yes on a bill 
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Model 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male 
Women 
 
.255*** 
(.031) 
.005 
(.013) 
.181*** 
(.037) 
.098*** 
(.017) 
.091** 
(.038) 
.086*** 
(.017) 
.148*** 
(.041) 
.156*** 
(.019) 
.129*** 
(.041) 
.154*** 
(.018) 
Men 
 
.113*** 
(.03) 
.215*** 
(.013) 
.162*** 
(.031) 
.218*** 
(.014) 
.173*** 
(.031) 
.22*** 
(.014) 
.243*** 
(.033) 
.279*** 
(.016) 
.251*** 
(.034) 
.278*** 
(.016) 
Difference 
 
.142*** 
(.006) 
-.21*** 
(.0) 
.019 
(.724) 
-.12*** 
(.0) 
-.082 
(.113) 
-.134*** 
(.0) 
-.095* 
(.094) 
-.123*** 
(.0) 
-.122** 
(.013) 
-.124*** 
(.0) 
Democrats 
 
  
.05** 
(.038) 
-.152*** 
(.017) 
.017 
(.039) 
-.14*** 
(.018) 
-.042 
(.049) 
-.034 
(.024) 
-.036 
(.05) 
-.029 
(.024) 
Republicans 
   
-.169*** 
(.028) 
-.012 
(.014) 
-.115*** 
(.029) 
-.008 
(.015) 
.007 
(.036) 
.007 
(.019) 
-.01 
(.036) 
.0 
(.019) 
Year Fixed Effects     X X X X X X 
Bill Fixed Effects 
      
X X X X 
State Fixed Effects         X X 
R2 .097 .046 .13 .058 .166 .061 .215 .093 .255 .113 
Observations 1381 7072 1381 7072 1381 7072 1381 7072 1381 7072 
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator for the legislator voting “Aye,” on, or in favor of, a bill. The independent variables are 
indicators for the majority of a group supporting a bill. Year, bill and state fixed effects (of which there were 3, 20 and 50, 
respectively) are included as additional controls. Standard errors are in parentheses, except for in the “Difference” row, in which 
parentheses contain between the p-value from the chi2 equality test. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level 
** Significant at the 5 percent level 
* Significant at the 10 percent level 
Table 6: Legislative Decision Model by Gender in the House of Representatives, 2008-2013 – All Bills
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that has a majority of Democrats’ support. This model still does not yet hold year, bill or state 
constant in the analysis, so these results could be picking up the effects of such variation.  
Model 3 introduces the addition of fixed effects into the equation. Controlling for year 
(2008, 2010, 2012), the effect of majority support by female constituents’ further diminishes, 
while the effect of equivalent support by male constituents’ grows, such that, for the first time, β1 
− β2 < 0. However, the difference between the two coefficients is insignificant, meaning 
congresswomen could in fact weigh the preferences of each gender equally. Congressmen still 
reflect the majority preferences of their male constituents to a greater extent than those of their 
female constituents, though this disparity has shrunk further upon including fixed effects for year.  
Fixed effects for the type of bill in Model 4 change the pattern. Despite an increase in the 
impact of majority female support on voting behavior by female legislators from the previous 
model, congresswomen appear to significantly favor the opinions held by the majority of their 
male constituents over those held by the majority of their female constituents, once the policy 
issue is controlled for. Specifically, support for a specific bill in a specific year, say, healthcare 
reform in 2010, by the majority of men in a district (in all states, from Arizona to Maine) relates 
to a 24.3 percentage-point increase in the likelihood that a female representative will vote for a 
bill, while the same support among women in the district sees only a 14.8 percentage point 
increase. Nevertheless, the gender-representation disparity favoring men is still larger for male 
legislators. Upon controlling for the type of policy, the effect of either party’s support on 
legislative behavior disappears; neither coefficient is significant. 
The impact of male constituents’ support on female representatives’ voting choices 
continues to grow in the last model (5), which contains fixed effects for all 50 states. The 
disparity in emphasis placed on female versus male majority opinion in the district grows, such 
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that majority male support in a district for a bill has nearly double the effect on the likelihood 
that a female representative will vote in favor than does majority female support for the same 
legislation. Once again, male legislators significantly reflect the majority opinion of men over 
that of women to a greater extent than do female legislators. Using the same example to 
demonstrate the role of fixed effects, the results from Model 5 indicate that, in a given year (e.g., 
2010) and state (e.g., Arizona), a male representative is 15.4 percentage points more likely to 
vote for a given bill (e.g., healthcare reform) that enjoys majority support among his female 
constituents, but this Arizona state congressman is 27.8 percentage points more likely to vote 
‘Aye’ on comprehensive healthcare if the majority of his male constituents support the 
legislation. Continuing with this example, a congresswoman from Arizona is 12.9 and 25.1 
percentage points more likely to vote for this comprehensive healthcare reform if the majority of 
women and men, respectively, support the legislation. In other words, holding constant year, bill 
and state, male and female legislators are both more likely to vote in accordance with their male 
constituents than their female constituents. This gender difference is slightly larger for male 
representatives, though majority support among representative voting yes) on their 
representative’s behavior 
Contentious Bills 
As seen above in the average congruence table (Table 5), restricting the sample to the 
bills over which men and women disagreed the most pulls the statistics to more extreme values. 
There does not emerge the same pattern as in Table 6, however, with the relationship between 
the voting behavior of female representatives and the preferences of their female constituents 
becoming increasingly relatively smaller upon adding more and more controls. In fact, only once 
do female representatives appear to favor the opinions of their male constituents more so than 
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Model 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male 
Women 
 
.308*** 
(.111) 
.147*** 
(.04) 
.301*** 
(.111) 
.155*** 
(.04) 
.303** 
(.112) 
.188*** 
(.04) 
.148*** 
(.041) 
.227*** 
(.04) 
.096*** 
(.098) 
.16*** 
(.038) 
Men 
 
.241*** 
(.056) 
.297*** 
(.024) 
.21*** 
(.059) 
.303*** 
(.027) 
.212*** 
(.059) 
.325*** 
(.027) 
.243*** 
(.033) 
.372*** 
(.029) 
.057*** 
(.053) 
.299*** 
(.028) 
Difference 
 
.067 
(.632) 
-.15*** 
(.004) 
.091 
(.515) 
-.148*** 
(.0) 
.091 
(.516) 
-.137*** 
(.009) 
-.095* 
(.094) 
-.145*** 
(.0) 
.039 
(.739) 
-.139*** 
(.005) 
Democrats 
 
  
N/A 
 
-.13 
(.134) 
N/A 
 
-.104*** 
(.133) 
-.042 
(.049) 
-.029 
(.131) 
N/A 
 
-.009 
(.123) 
Republicans 
   
.086 
(.052) 
-.015 
(.029) 
.086 
(.053) 
-.023 
(.029) 
.007 
(.036) 
.04 
(.033) 
.037 
(.051) 
.032 
(.031) 
Year Fixed Effects     X X X X X X 
Bill Fixed Effects 
      
X X X X 
State Fixed Effects 
        
X X 
R2 .098 .107 .105 .108 .105 .127 .132 .166 .523 .308 
Observations 347 1751 347 1751 347 1751 347 1751 347 1751 
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator for the legislator voting “Aye,” on, or in favor of, a bill. The independent variables are 
indicators for the majority of a group supporting a bill. Year, bill and state fixed effects (of which there were 3, 20 and 50, 
respectively) are included as additional controls. Standard errors are in parentheses, except for in the “Difference” row, in which 
parentheses contain between the p-value from the chi2 equality test. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level 
** Significant at the 5 percent level 
* Significant at the 10 percent level 
Table 7: Legislative Decision Model by Gender in the House of Representatives, 2008-2013 – Contentious Bills
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their female constituents (Model 4) regarding preferences towards contentious legislation, and 
that gender disparity is only significant at the 10% level. Instead, the difference between men 
and women at the district level in terms of the effect they have on female legislators’ voting 
behavior is insignificant in virtually all models.  
Nevertheless, majority support among female constituents appears to exert consistently 
greater influence on female legislators than majority support among male constituents. For 
instance, Model 5 suggests that a congresswoman is 9.6 percentage points significantly more 
likely to vote in favor of a given contentious bill when the majority of her female constituents 
also favor it, but only 5.7 percentage points significantly more likely to do so when the majority 
of her male constituents support the legislation. Holding constant year, bill and state, majority 
support among women and men, respectively, in a district significantly increases the likelihood 
that a male representative will vote in favor of the given contentious bill by 16 and 30 percentage 
points. Thus, congressmen demonstrate a similar legislative decision framework behavior pattern 
as above, weighing the opinions of the majority of their male constituents significantly more 
highly than those of their female constituents. For male representatives, β1 − β2 is consistently 
less than zero, meaning majority support by men systematically has a greater effect than majority 
support by women on the likelihood that male representative will vote for a piece of legislation. 
For contentious bills, those over which men and women greatly disagree, majority support 
among men indicates an even higher increase in positive voting by male representatives than it 
does for all bills in the sample.  
The same can be said of congresswomen: regarding controversial issues, majority support 
by women in districts leads to an increased chance that female representatives will vote in favor 
of the bill by around 30 percentage points (Table 7, Model 1-3), not controlling for year, bill or 
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state. As in the previous analysis, however, additional controls, particularly the fixed effects of 
bill and state, decrease the influence of shared gender on representation. In fact, up until these 
last two models, the influence of female constituents’ opinion on their female legislators was 
larger than on their male legislators, as indicated by the magnitude of the coefficient on female 
majority support in the two legislative decision models. However, these fixed effects so greatly 
reduce the influence of female political preferences that majority support among women in a 
district leads to a greater likelihood that their male representatives, as opposed to their female 
representatives, will vote in favor of a bill (Table 7, Models 4 and 5).  
 
Further Analysis  
Different Party Control 
In Table 7, there is clear and large drop in the magnitude of the coefficient on the variable 
representing majority support among women (Majority_Female_Constituents_Support) in a 
district in the female representative equation of Model 4, which introduces fixed effects for bill. 
However, a similar drop is not seen for any other coefficient, in either equation (male or female 
representative) upon including bill fixed effects. In brainstorming why this may have occurred, 
party affiliation of the representative comes to mind. Since men in the House of Representatives 
and the general public are more evenly distributed between the political parties, controlling for 
the type of legislation, whether left- or right-leaning, may result in a gender-representation 
relationship that is essentially “cancelled” out for male constituents (i.e., the men who support a 
bill balance out those who do not). Yet, since women in the House and in the general public are 
more likely to be Democrats, the legislation in the data may lead to a mutual agreement between 
female representatives and their female constituents regarding Democratic opinions over the 
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legislation. In this way, controlling for the type of bill would reduce the coefficient on majority 
female support in the female representative equation (because women often share both gender 
and party with their female representatives), while having very little, if any, effect on the any of 
the other coefficients in either equation, since those relationships (e.g., male-male or male-
female) do not share gender while at the same time systematically favoring a certain political 
party as well. It is therefore necessary to create and include a variable that accounts for the 
agreement between legislators and the constituents that belong to their political party; there is 
reason to believe that the variables used in the regression equations above do not accomplish this, 
as the coefficients on indicators of majority support by party were surprisingly small (the 
literature on this subject found that political party is the largest predictor of voting behavior).  
It is important that the agreement between legislators and their constituents regarding 
certain bills due to shared political party and shared gender are differentiated. Thus, I create a 
variable that is equal to 1 if a majority of the constituents of the party of the legislator (either 
democrats or republicans) favor the bill, and zero otherwise. This new variable replaces both of 
the binary indicators, and demonstrates the influence of majority support among constituents of a 
legislator’s own party. For example, for a Democratic legislator, it is the influence that majority 
support among his or her Democratic constituents has on the likelihood that he or she will vote 
for a bill. This variable is titled “Party Control” (first demonstrated in Equation 3, above) in 
subsequent tables. 
The results from including this variable are noteworthy, and support the findings 
discussed in the literature review. If the majority of constituents in a legislator’s (either male or 
female) own party support a bill, the representative is 54-58 percentage points more likely to 
vote for the bill. For example, a Republican female representative in a given state is 57.3 
  50 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male 
Women 
 
.255*** 
(.031) 
.005 
(.013) 
.019 
(.029) 
-.115*** 
(.012) 
-.126*** 
(.031) 
-.126*** 
(.013) 
-.065* 
(.035) 
.003 
(.016) 
-.071** 
(.035) 
.005 
(.016) 
Men 
 
.113*** 
(.03) 
.215*** 
(.013) 
-.046* 
(.027) 
.015 
(.012) 
-.011 
(.026) 
.016*** 
(.012) 
.069** 
(.033) 
.067*** 
(.014) 
.073** 
(.03) 
.066*** 
(.014) 
Difference 
 
.142*** 
(.006) 
-.21*** 
(.0) 
.065 
(.151) 
-.13*** 
(.0) 
-.115** 
(.014) 
-.142*** 
(.0) 
-.134*** 
(.005) 
-.064*** 
(.004) 
-.144*** 
(.003) 
-.061* 
(.0057) 
Party Control 
 
  
.565*** 
(.027) 
.536*** 
(.012) 
.569 
(.026) 
.547*** 
(.012) 
.579*** 
(.026) 
.579*** 
(.012) 
.573*** 
(.027) 
.576*** 
(.012) 
Year Fixed Effects     X X X X X X 
Bill Fixed Effects 
      
X X X X 
State Fixed Effects         X X 
R2 .097 .046 .311 .265 .368 .279 .422 .33 .442 .341 
Observations 1381 7072 1381 7072 1381 7072 1381 7072 1381 7072 
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator for the legislator voting “Aye,” on, or in favor of, a bill. The first two independent 
variables are indicators for the majority of a gender supporting a bill, and the third independent variable is an indicator for whether or 
not the majority of a legislator’s own party supported a bill. Year, bill and state fixed effects (of which there were 3, 20 and 50, 
respectively) are included as additional controls. Standard errors are in parentheses, except for in the “Difference” row, in which 
parentheses contain between the p-value from the chi2 equality test. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level 
** Significant at the 5 percent level 
* Significant at the 10 percent level 
Table 8: Legislative Decision Model by Gender in the House of Representatives with Legislator’s Party, 2008-2013 – All Bills
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Model 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male 
Women 
 
.308*** 
(.112) 
.147*** 
(.04) 
-.011 
(.07) 
.019 
(.032) 
-.012 
(.07) 
.047 
(.032) 
.008 
(.07) 
.095*** 
(.032) 
-.106 
(.071) 
.059* 
(.031) 
Men 
 
.241*** 
(.056) 
.297*** 
(.242) 
.037 
(.035) 
.047** 
(.021) 
.036 
(.036) 
.064 
(.021) 
.064 
(.038) 
.138*** 
(.024) 
-0.031** 
(.038) 
.088*** 
(.023) 
Difference 
 
.067 
(.632) 
-.15*** 
(.004) 
-.147 
(.576) 
-.028 
(.501) 
-.048 
(.576) 
-.017 
(.674) 
-.056 
(.517) 
-.043 
(.301) 
-.075 
(.379) 
-.029 
(.462) 
Party Control 
 
  
.871*** 
(.036) 
.656*** 
(.021) 
.871*** 
(.036) 
.65*** 
(.021) 
.866*** 
(.036) 
.65*** 
(.02) 
.754*** 
(.044) 
.605*** 
(.02) 
Year Fixed Effects     X X X X X X 
Bill Fixed Effects 
      
X X X X 
State Fixed Effects         X X 
R2 .098 .107 .662 .429 .662 .442 .675 .33 .753 .341 
Observations 347 1751 347 1751 347 1751 347 1751 347 1751 
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator for the legislator voting “Aye,” on, or in favor of, a bill. The first two independent 
variables are indicators for the majority of a gender supporting a bill, and the third independent variable is an indicator for whether or 
not the majority of a legislator’s own party supported a bill. Year, bill and state fixed effects (of which there were 3, 20 and 50, 
respectively) are included as additional controls. Standard errors are in parentheses, except for in the “Difference” row, in which 
parentheses contain between the p-value from the chi2 equality test. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level 
** Significant at the 5 percent level 
* Significant at the 10 percent level 
Table 9: Legislative Decision Model by Gender in the House of Representatives with Legislator’s Party, 2008-2013 – Contentious 
Bills 
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percentage points more likely to support a bill if the majority of her Republican constituents 
support it, even controlling for both male and female preferences on that bill (Table 8). 
  An unexpected pattern emerges when observing the relationship between female majority 
support at the district and female representative voting behavior, however. In almost all of the 
models, majority support among women in a district leads to a significant decrease in the 
likelihood that a congresswoman will vote for the bill. Yet, majority support by men in a district 
is almost always significantly and positively correlated with an affirmative vote by a female 
representative. As seen consistently above, congressmen appear to be more swayed by majority 
preferences of their male, as opposed to female, constituents. Also important are the R2 values; 
the larger numbers indicate that the new party control variable produces a stronger model, which 
explains a greater deal of the variation in the system. These findings support the construction of a 
new variable to control for the shared party of the legislator and constituents in the first place.  
 When the analysis is restricted to contentious bills, as is done above, the coefficient on 
the “party control” variable grows (Table 9). Congresswomen are 75-87 percentage points more 
likely to vote for a controversial bill if the majority of her constituents in her party support it, 
while congressmen are only 60-65 percentage points more likely to do so. None of the 
coefficients on the majority female support indicators are significant in this table, potentially a 
result of the smaller sample size. Male legislators still appear to be more influenced by the 
majority support of their male constituents than by that of their female constituents, even when 
controlling for the effects of shared political party with constituents. The magnitude of these 
coefficients is notably smaller than in Tables 6 and 7, possibly suggesting that earlier results 
were attributing to shared gender what are actually the representation implications of shared 
party.  
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Model 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male 
Proportion Women 
 
.828*** 
(.083) 
-.05 
(.037) 
.3*** 
(.08) 
-.311*** 
(.034) 
-.146 
(.092) 
-.378*** 
(.041) 
.131 
(.109) 
.363*** 
(.054) 
.142  
(.11) 
.37*** 
(.054) 
Proportion Men 
 
.04 
(.1) 
.803*** 
(.044) 
-.269*** 
(.091) 
.204*** 
(.042) 
-.026 
(.092) 
.233*** 
(.044) 
.305*** 
(.099) 
.512*** 
(.051) 
0.298*** 
(.038) 
.513*** 
(.051) 
Difference 
 
.788*** 
(.0) 
-.853*** 
(.0) 
.569*** 
(.0) 
-.515*** 
(.0) 
.06 
(.476) 
.611*** 
(.0) 
-.174 
(.32) 
-.149* 
(.082) 
-.156 
(.382) 
-.143* 
(.096) 
Party Control 
 
  
.527*** 
(.029) 
.527*** 
(.012) 
.551*** 
(.028) 
.541*** 
(.012) 
.528*** 
(.028) 
.509*** 
(.037) 
.522*** 
(.029) 
.507*** 
(.012) 
Year Fixed Effects     X X X X X X 
Bill Fixed Effects 
      
X X X X 
State Fixed Effects         X X 
R2 .15 .072 .317 .263 .362 .277 .425 .348 .445 .359 
Observations 1381 7072 1381 7072 1381 7072 1381 7072 1381 7072 
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator for the legislator voting “Aye,” on, or in favor of, a bill. The first two independent 
variables are continuous measurements of the proportion of either gender that supports a bill, and the third independent variable is an 
indicator for whether or not the majority of a legislator’s own party supported a bill. Year, bill and state fixed effects (of which there 
were 3, 20 and 50, respectively) are included as additional controls. Standard errors are in parentheses, except for in the “Difference” 
row, in which parentheses contain between the p-value from the chi2 equality test. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level 
** Significant at the 5 percent level 
* Significant at the 10 percent level 
Table 10: Continuous Legislative Decision Model by Gender in the House of Representatives with Legislator’s Party, 2008-2013 – All 
Bills 
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Continuous Variables  
In Tables 10 and 11, I repeat the regressions executed previously, running the same 
progression of five models, but with continuous variables instead of binary ones in order to 
represent the support among men and women in the district. Specifically, I replace the binary 
variables indicating majority or minority support among men and women (0 and 1, respectively), 
with continuous variables that equal the proportion of support among men and women for a bill.  
Initial results (Model 1, Table 10) suggest a representation bias in attention towards one’s 
own gender. In the simplest model, a 1-percentage point increase in support among a district’s 
female constituents translates to an 83 percentage-point increase in the likelihood that their 
congresswoman will vote for a bill, while the same increase in political backing among male 
constituents leads to an 80 percentage-point increase in the likelihood that their congressman will 
vote for the bill. This gender difference in ‘influence,’ with female legislators responding more 
heavily to their female constituents, and male legislators to their male constituents, is statistically 
significant for both female and male representatives. These coefficients plummet, however, upon 
controlling for the legislator’s party beliefs: a 1-percentage point increase in support for a bill 
among either gender group is associated with a roughly 30 percentage point increase that their 
same-sex legislator will vote for the bill.  
Consistent with values found in the last analysis, majority support among a legislator’s 
own party for a bill leads to a 53-percentage point rise in the chance that the legislator will 
support it. By the most complex model, which also controls for year, bill and state, another 
unexpected pattern emerges. Female legislators once again appear to be more guided by the 
preferences of their male constituents than by those of their female constituents when deciding 
how to vote: a 1-percentage point increase in support for legislation corresponds to a 30- 
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percentage point increase in the likelihood that a female representative will vote for the bill, but 
the same marginal growth in support among women in the district increases the chances that the 
congresswoman will vote for the bill by only 14 percentage points, less than half the ‘effect’ that 
men enjoy. Consistent will all previous findings, it seems that congressmen are more heavily 
influenced by the views of male constituents: a 1-percentage point increase in support among the 
district’s men for certain legislation relates to a 51-percentage point increase in the probability 
that their male representative will vote in favor of the bill, but a corresponding uptick in support 
among the district’s women leads to only a 37-percentage point increase. 
Restricting the analysis to contentious bills when examining the continuous measures of 
gender support leads to different results (Table 11). For these kinds of controversial acts of 
legislation, shared political party appears to have a much greater impact on a representative’s 
voting behavior: congresswomen are 72-85 percentage points more likely, and congressmen 55-
63 percentage points more likely, to vote for a bill that has majority support among his or her 
party in the district. It is difficult to extract any consequences behind possible relative benefits 
female constituents share with their female legislators, as almost all of the relevant coefficients 
are insignificant in Table 11. Nevertheless, the pattern congressmen have exhibited throughout 
this investigation holds, suggesting again that they are more influenced by the political attitudes 
of their male, not female, constituents, even if only marginally (Model 5).  
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Model 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male 
Proportion Women 
 
.913*** 
(.224) 
.464*** 
(.102) 
-.068 
(.15) 
-.04 
(.086) 
-.07 
(.152) 
.014 
(.085) 
.214 
(.165) 
.644*** 
(.1) 
.14  
(.167) 
.466*** 
(.096) 
Proportion Men 
 
.416** 
(.206) 
.939*** 
(.099) 
.248* 
(.133) 
.373*** 
(.084) 
.248 
(.133) 
.409*** 
(.083) 
.333** 
(.133) 
.649*** 
(.082) 
.004 
(.142) 
.473*** 
(.084) 
Difference 
 
.497 
(.219) 
-.505** 
(.0108) 
-.316 
(.229) 
-.413*** 
(.007) 
-.318 
(.227) 
-.395*** 
(.009) 
-.119 
(.649) 
-.005 
(.973) 
.136 
(.609) 
-.007* 
(.965) 
Party Control 
 
  
.854*** 
(.039) 
.625*** 
(.022) 
.854*** 
(.039) 
.617*** 
(.022) 
.814*** 
(.039) 
.569*** 
(.021) 
.717*** 
(.047) 
.551*** 
(.021) 
Year Fixed Effects     X X X X X X 
Bill Fixed Effects 
      
X X X X 
State Fixed Effects         X X 
R2 .188 .172 .666 .437 .666 .450 .686 .512 .752 .565 
Observations 347 1751 347 1751 347 1751 347 1751 347 1751 
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator for the legislator voting “Aye,” on, or in favor of, a bill. The first two independent 
variables are continuous measurements of the proportion of either gender that supports a bill, and the third independent variable is an 
indicator for whether or not the majority of a legislator’s own party supported a bill. Year, bill and state fixed effects (of which there 
were 3, 20 and 50, respectively) are included as additional controls. Standard errors are in parentheses, except for in the “Difference” 
row, in which parentheses contain between the p-value from the chi2 equality test. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level 
** Significant at the 5 percent level 
* Significant at the 10 percent level 
Table 11: Continuous Legislative Decision Model by Gender in the House of Representatives with Legislator’s Party, 2008-2013 – 
Contentious Bills
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Discussion 
    On average, female legislators demonstrate significantly greater congruence with their 
female constituents than with their male constituents, meaning they reflect the preferences of 
their own gender more so than those of the opposite sex (Table 4). As predicted, male legislators 
vote significantly more frequently in accordance with the men in their district than with the 
women (Table 4). Interestingly, women in the House of Representatives reflect the views of both 
men and women in their district more often than do male representatives, but this difference is 
only significant regarding the representation of female constituents. When the analysis is 
restricted exclusively to contentious bills, those over the 75th percentile of disagreement between 
men and women, most of the gender congruence values grow (Table 5). The greater congruence 
both women and men enjoy with their female representatives, as opposed to with their male 
representatives, regarding contentious bills is statistically significant. 
Regarding the regression results, the influence of women’s opinion on their female 
legislators’ voting behavior diminishes as more controls are added to the model, with the female 
representatives switching patterns, such that they appear more influence by their male 
constituents than by their female constituents. This turnaround occurs in Model 3 of Table 6 and 
Model 4 of Table 7, when controls for year and bill are included. This suggests support for my 
argument above, that political climate change from year to year affects the gender-representation 
relationship between constituents and their legislators, as certain issues become more salient than 
others due to current events, changing demographics, and media coverage.  
Taking the results from Model 5 (Table 6), which contains party controls and fixed 
effects for year, bill and state, as the most valid, an unexpected pattern emerges. Both female and 
male legislators in in the House of Representatives appear to be more influenced by the majority 
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preferences of their male constituents over those of their female constituents. This is obviously 
contrary to my hypothesis, that women in office will better respond to the desires of their female 
constituents.  
Yet, it is important to note that in Tables 6 and 7, female representatives’ bias only 
emerges after including controls for year and bill, and then persists. The same progression is not 
observed for male representatives: regardless of the model, congressmen echo the sentiments of 
their male constituents over those of their female constituents. This change in pattern in Models 
3-5 (from Models 1 and 2) in both tables suggests that the time period, brand of legislation and 
region of the country all serve to significantly moderate the gender-representation relationship 
for female representatives, but not for male representatives. Although the logic behind this 
moderation is somewhat intuitive, the absence of such an effect on the gender-representation 
relationship for male representatives is a mystery. 
Women in office may be more influenced by the preferences of their female constituents 
in one year over another because of a multitude of factors. A single news story can thrust women 
to the forefront of political pandering one year, while women’s groups may better mobilize to 
lobby their priorities during another. Female representatives remain more strongly swayed by the 
opinions of their male constituents than by those of the women in their district after controlling 
for bill. This pattern also makes sense from a gender and political standpoint: variation in the 
content of a bill would indeed affect the extent to which gender matters in representation. 
Congresswomen may greatly value the position of their female constituents on some bills, such 
as “women’s issue” bills, and prioritize other stakeholders when voting on different legislation. 
Therefore, the results in the latter models of the initial tables do not necessarily invalidate any 
role of shared gender in our democratic system. Rather, the fact that the topic and composition of 
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a law appears to change exactly to whom our representatives are beholden is probably a victory 
for democracy. The weight of female constituents on their congresswoman’s voting choice on a 
given bill in a given year is further reduced upon controlling for state, which supports the notion 
that unobserved factors in certain regions of the country weaken or strengthen the extent to 
which shared gender has an effect on the legislation process. Men in certain states may comprise 
the louder gender, more effectively communicating their judgments on a variety of issues. Or, 
there could exist a gender-disparity in terms of political donations that varies from state to state, 
in which female representatives find themselves beholden to the political preferences of the men 
who funded their campaign for office.  
 The ultimate findings in Table 6, Model 5 are impossible to unequivocally explain. Even 
controlling for the year, bill and state, I did not expect that female representatives would mimic 
the gender bias of their male counterparts. Clearly, the time period, kind of legislation and state 
from which the congresswoman hails impacts the probability that she mirrors the viewpoints of 
most women in her district. This transition, from more strongly responding to the opinions of the 
majority of their female constituents to being relatively more guided by the preferences of their 
male constituents, by female representatives throughout the models in Table 6, and the complete 
lack of a parallel (equal and opposite) shift for male representatives, yields a new mystery, and is 
interesting enough to warrant further research. My conclusion therefore still begs the question: 
what exactly is it within the variation found in the year, bill and state variables that, when 
controlled for, switches the gender-representation relationship for female representatives and 
constituents such that congresswomen appear to favor men’s political preferences? The cultural, 
political and financial explanations given just above serve as possible factors, but, as stated, it is 
impossible to know for sure.  
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  Any doubt that the type of bill in question plays a strong role in the relationship between 
gender and representation is quelled upon reviewing the results in Table 7. When the analysis is 
restricted to contentious bills, a different pattern emerges for female representatives only. As for 
all bills, male representatives are consistently more heavily influenced by the opinions of their 
male constituents over those of their female constituents when voting on legislation over which 
men and women tend to disagree. Contrary to the results for all bills, regarding strictly 
controversial bills, congresswomen, too, appear to respond more intensely to the legislative 
desires of their own gender, and this pattern does not switch direction upon adding more controls 
(though women’s influence on their female representatives does diminish greatly in the latter 
models).   
A possible takeaway from these results is that women in office are generally more 
influenced by male opinions, but when “push comes to shove,” they listen to the beliefs of their 
own gender – to the women in their districts. Legislation that creates sizeable disagreement 
between men and women is likely to be generally polarizing, and is therefore expected to 
engender extensive media coverage and national attention. With the whole nation watching, 
particularly their own constituents, congresswomen may deliberately act on the political desires 
of women in their district more so than the men’s. 
This gender-bias, in terms of which sex is more influential on voting behavior, is larger 
for male representatives than for female representatives. Perhaps noteworthy as well is that the 
difference in the coefficient on the binary variables indicating majority male support and 
majority female support, which represent the respective influence each gender’s political beliefs 
have on their legislator’s voting actions, is insignificant. While it is true that this means the two 
coefficients could be equal, translating into equal relative representation for each gender by 
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female representatives (as opposed to the clear partiality consistently and significantly 
demonstrated by male legislators), the smaller sample size in this equation (restricted to both 
female legislators and contentious bills) makes significance more difficult to achieve. I therefore 
am careful not to overstate the weight of this particular finding, from a statistical standpoint.  
Also notable is the magnitude of the coefficients in Model 5 (Table 7), which I again take 
to be the most valid. Although the sway of majority support among women in a district on their 
female representative’s voting decisions outweighs the impact of the majority opinion held by 
men, and the reverse is also true for male representatives, the magnitude of this influence is 
larger for both genders in relation to their male representatives. In other words, majority support 
for a bill among women in a district leads to a much greater probability that a male 
representative, rather than a female representative, will vote yes on that legislation, all else equal. 
So, although congressmen are more responsive to the inclinations of their male constituents over 
those of their female constituents, women appear to exert greater influence on their male 
representatives than on their female representatives. The fact that both gender indicator variables, 
representing each gender’s political views, have larger coefficients in the male representative 
equation suggest that other factors, presumably represented in the controls, have a greater 
relative effect on congresswomen’s voting behavior.  
This paper supports current research in concluding that a legislator’s political party has 
enormous consequences on voting behavior. In the last four tables (Tables 8-11), which account 
for the preferences of constituents belonging to a representative’s own party, the apparent impact 
of shared gender falls. Thus, gender plays a small role in the political process compared to other 
institutions in our democracy.   
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 So, are women in office more likely than their male counterparts to reflect the political 
views of their female constituents? Do women “better” represent women? Does descriptive 
representation, as Michele Swers insists it does, indeed translate into substantive representation 
for women (1998)? As in most things, it turns out that circumstance matters a great deal. There is 
not a clear answer, as “better” is obviously a subjective and vague term.  
 It is important to consider the results of the first analysis, demonstrating representation 
“on average.” Although these results are not produced from a regression, they nevertheless tell a 
very direct, clear and important story. Female representatives have much greater congruence (i.e., 
agreement between roll call voting and legislative views) with both genders than do male 
representatives, even for gender-polarizing legislation. On average, both women and men are 
more likely to agree with the voting decisions of a female legislator than a male legislator. The 
gender-bias still exists, though in a manner more consistent with the expectations of my 
hypothesis: both men and women in the House of Representatives possess greater congruence, 
that is, agreement, with their own genders. So, female legislators are more likely to vote in 
accordance with the preferences of women in their districts than with those of the men, and male 
legislators are more likely to reflect the views of the men in their districts than those of the 
women. Representation “on the margin” presents (in the regression tables) results that are 
somewhat consistent with those in this “average representation” analysis. Thus, the question 
becomes, what matters more in attempting to discern the policy impact of women in office for 
women in society, representation “on average,” or “on the margin”? 
Unfailingly, congressmen’s votes are more positively manipulated by the men in their 
districts when it comes to voting on legislation in the House of Representatives. Women in office 
seemingly mimic this gender-representation bias, but only after the time period, type of 
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legislation, and region is taken into account, a critical shift, if only for the reason that it does not 
exist for male representatives. But when it comes to highly controversial bills, female House 
members are more heavily swayed by the views of women in their districts. Yet, the impact that 
majority support among women in a district has on the probability that the representative will 
vote for the bill is much larger for male representatives than it is for female representatives, no 
matter how contentious the bill is. So, the question becomes: what matters more in 
representation: bias, or magnitude?  
The fact that the initial regression results do not perfectly mirror the congruence tables 
suggests that this concept of representation is a complex system, with dynamic components. 
Gender and representation may not have an easily discernible and interpretable relationship: 
while congressmen exhibit roughly the same pattern in every single model (put simply, favoring 
men), the gender-representation relationship exhibited by congresswomen varies greatly 
depending on the equation. Thus, there appear to be many more factors at play in female 
representatives’ legislative decision models than in those of their male counterparts.  
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Appendix 
 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male 
Women 
 
.234*** 
(.027) 
.005 
(.013) 
.165*** 
(.035) 
.101*** 
(.017) 
.081** 
(.038) 
.089*** 
(.017) 
.131*** 
(.038) 
.16*** 
(.019) 
.11*** 
(.037) 
.157*** 
(.018) 
Men 
 
.108*** 
(.029) 
.207*** 
(.012) 
.16*** 
(.03) 
.211*** 
(.013) 
.173*** 
(.029) 
.212*** 
(.013) 
.232*** 
(.032) 
.273*** 
(.015) 
.241*** 
(.031) 
.271*** 
(.015) 
Difference 
 
.126** 
(.011) 
-.204*** 
(.0) 
.005 
(.93) 
-.11*** 
(.0) 
-.092* 
(.081) 
-.123*** 
(.0) 
-.101** 
(.013) 
-.113*** 
(.0) 
-.131** 
(.013) 
-.114*** 
(.0) 
Democrats 
 
  
.042 
(.036) 
-.155*** 
(.017) 
.012 
(.037) 
-.143*** 
(.018) 
-.038  
(.046) 
-.034 
(.024) 
-.033 
(.045) 
-.03 
(.024) 
Republicans 
   
-.169*** 
(.027) 
-.01 
(.014) 
-.114***  
(.028) 
-.007  
(.015) 
.01  
(.037) 
.007  
(.019) 
-.011 
(.036) 
.0 
(.019) 
Year Fixed Effects     X X X X X X 
Bill Fixed Effects 
      
X X X X 
State Fixed Effects 
        
X X 
Observations 1381 7072 1381 7072 1381 7072 1381 7072 1381 7072 
Notes: This table displays the marginal effects of a Probit regression akin to the linear probability models run in Tables 6 and 7. The 
dependent variable is an indicator for the legislator voting “Aye,” on, or in favor of, a bill. The independent variables are indicators for 
the majority of a group supporting a bill. Year, bill and state fixed effects (of which there were 3, 20 and 50, respectively) are included 
as additional controls. Standard errors are in parentheses, except for in the “Difference” row, in which parentheses contain between the 
p-value from the chi2 equality test. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level 
** Significant at the 5 percent level 
* Significant at the 10 percent level 
Table 12: Probit Legislative Decision Model by Gender in the House of Representatives, 2008-2013 – All Bills
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Model 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male 
Women 
 
.241** 
(.101) 
.154*** 
(.041) 
.231** 
(.1) 
.164*** 
(.042) 
.234** 
(.1) 
.194*** 
(.041) 
.258** 
(.101) 
.241*** 
(.042) 
.184* 
(.112) 
.177*** 
(.041) 
Men 
 
.208*** 
(.048) 
.279*** 
(.021) 
.174*** 
(.051) 
.286*** 
(.024) 
.177*** 
(.052) 
.307*** 
(.023) 
.208*** 
(.055) 
.353*** 
(.025) 
.04 
(.061) 
.289*** 
(.026) 
Difference 
 
.033 
(.794) 
-.125** 
(.018) 
.057 
(.649) 
-.022** 
(.0) 
.057 
(.65) 
-.113** 
(.035) 
.05 
(.695) 
-.112** 
(.035) 
.144 
(.284) 
-.112** 
(.031) 
Democrats 
 
  
N/A 
 
-.138 
(.131) 
N/A 
 
-.111 
(.129) 
N/A 
 
-.037 
(.125) 
N/A 
 
-.028 
(.116) 
Republicans 
   
.099*** 
(.056) 
-.015 
(.029) 
.1*  
(.056) 
-.022  
(.029) 
.136** 
(.062) 
.04  
(.032) 
-.076 
(.07) 
.042 
(.032) 
Year Fixed Effects     X X X X X X 
Bill Fixed Effects 
      
X X X X 
State Fixed Effects 
        
X X 
Observations 347 1751 347 1751 347 1751 347 1751 347 1751 
Notes: This table displays the marginal effects of a Probit regression akin to the linear probability models run in Tables 6 and 7. The 
dependent variable is an indicator for the legislator voting “Aye,” on, or in favor of, a bill. The independent variables are indicators for 
the majority of a group supporting a bill. Year, bill and state fixed effects (of which there were 3, 20 and 50, respectively) are included 
as additional controls. Standard errors are in parentheses, except for in the “Difference” row, in which parentheses contain between the 
p-value from the chi2 equality test. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level 
** Significant at the 5 percent level 
* Significant at the 10 percent level 
Table 13: Probit Legislative Decision Model by Gender in the House of Representatives, 2008-2013 – Contentious Bills
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